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Approved For Release 2002/10/21 : CIA-RDP89B00569R000400050002-4

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4-7 DECEMBER 1959

I. GENERAL:

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A. OBJECTIVES: The objectives of the [redacted] Operation as encompassed by Operations Order 13-59 were as follows:

1. Establish a pre-strike base at [redacted].

2. Ferry [redacted] 351 to [redacted]

3. Launch a photo intelligence strike mission from [redacted]

4. Post-strike at [redacted]

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B. STAGING:

1. Preparation: Staging personnel were chosen, staging gear was pre-flighted and serviced, canned missions were drawn and loading manifests were prepared.

2. Pre-deployment: 29 Nov. with the arrival of the support aircraft came the major problems of the staging. Problem #1 was the crew orders. The C-124 crew had orders that outlined the route that the [redacted] staging aircraft were to use all the way to [redacted]

Problem #2 was the completely uncooperative attitude of the C-130 aircraft commander. Even after being shown correspondence that stated that the [redacted] commander had operational control of the support aircraft which included authority to waive crew day and crew rest requirements at any time needed to insure the success of the mission the C-130 commander continued to perform as if he was under the operational control of the 322nd Air Division ie the C-130 aircraft commander attempted to have the motor scooter which has been part of our staging equipment since operation [redacted] removed from the aircraft. He had to be instructed in the fact that he was to fly the aircraft and that it wasn't his responsibility to determine what gear was or was not required for the operation.

During the entire operation he dragged his feet whenever the opportunity presented itself, using regulations as weapons to fight doing the job. Problem #3, during the early pre-staging period the 322nd Air Div constantly interrogated their crews via the [redacted] single side band radio telephone circuit about takeoff times. How long before they would be finished etc. Messages on diplomatic clearances were sent to [redacted] through the communications facilities of [redacted] (Base Comm), all these messages included the final destination of the operation.

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3. Movement: A total flying time of 10:50 +50 minutes ground time at [redacted] put the staging party in place at [redacted] 11:40 hours after departing [redacted]

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4. Staging Area: After landing at [redacted] the unloading of the C-130 was delayed for two hours so the hangar that was to be used could be evacuated by the local personnel. This time was

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gravy time and was worth its sacrifice for the extra security we gained operating from the hangar. The C-124 landed at 1915Z and the fuel was unloaded and placed in the hangar. The [redacted] landed at 2305Z, was preflighted and refueled. 0400Z 6 December the mission was launched. The area was policed, the C-130 was leaded except for commo. After authorization was given to close down, the commo equipment was loaded and the staging team departed for [redacted]. The C-130 landed at [redacted] 0715Z a total elapsed time of 56:55 hours, [redacted]

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C. CONCLUSIONS: The time table as set up for the "Fast Move" operation is both realistic and flexible. The C-130 is the ideal type aircraft for this operation.

D. RECOMMENDATIONS:

1. Support aircraft commanders be briefed by their unit commander that:

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a. After arriving at [redacted] commander has full operational control of the crew, to include the waiving of crew day and crew rest criteria and any other criteria that he deems necessary to successfully complete the operation.

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b. That on arriving at [redacted] the aircraft commander or his crew members will not communicate with the 322nd Air Division unless the topic of conversation is cleared by the [redacted] commander.

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2. Diplomatic clearances be obtained by USAFE. This will be for both the in and out trips, originator of request will be responsible for getting correct tail numbers. If clearances have been requested USAFE should so indicate by cable quoting the USAFE message numbers to all addresses. At this point Hqs should not send the final go [redacted] unless they agree that the staging commander is authorized to take off even though the approval of the diplomatic clearance has not actually been received at [redacted]

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3. All communications to [redacted] will be by KUBARK channels only. This to include diplomatic clearances notification.

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4. Back up aircraft should be dispatched by USAFE immediately upon word by [redacted] of the actual takeoff times of the two original aircraft at [redacted]

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5. For [redacted] (USAFE) in Ops Order [redacted] should instruct and advise the office that requests diplomatic clearances that no passenger manifests will be submitted due to special security considerations. There should not be any traffic necessary with [redacted] to know this.

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6. Due to difficulty in obtaining [] visas and even when one is obtained it is not good for but one entry and exit, refueling stop for C-124s should be [] Multiple entry type visa with a 3 month coverage has been the usual from []

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7. USAFE responsible: To assure that crews have proper visas (they will now always have a copy of the Ops Order). No traffic should be necessary to discuss the matter. If USAFE allows the support aircraft to be dispatched they will be known to have the proper visas.

8. Air Attaches should be held responsible for assuring that messages go OPIM to USAFE advising of arrival and departure times at the various known locations for the support aircraft. In the instance of [] should acquire and also dispatch the information OPIM.

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II. TIMETABLE

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<u>SCHEDULED</u>	<u>ACTUAL</u>	<u>EVENT/ACTION</u>	
AS DIRECTED	04/2130Z	C-124 Departed	<input type="text"/> 25X1C
04/2220Z	04/2220Z	C-130 Departed	<input type="text"/> 25X1C
05/1215Z	05/0955Z	C-130 Arrived	<input type="text"/> 25X1C
AS DIRECTED	05/1800Z	C-124 Arrived	<input type="text"/>
05/1745Z	05/1745Z	U-2C 351 Departed	<input type="text"/> 25X1C
05/2315Z	05/2255Z	U-2C 351 Arrived	<input type="text"/> 25X1C
06/0415Z	06/0400Z	U-2C 351 Departed	<input type="text"/>
06/1425Z	06/1215Z	U-2C 351 Arrived	<input type="text"/> 25X1C
AS DIRECTED	06/1630Z	C-130 Departed	<input type="text"/> 25X1C
*AS DIRECTED	07/0715Z	C-130 Arrived	<input type="text"/> 25X1C

*Delayed two hours at for maintenance.

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III. INDIVIDUAL SECTION COMMENTS

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B. OPERATIONS:1. Comments:

a. 4 Dec 59: Operation [] was triggered by the [] message that authorized the C-124 to depart []. Within an extremely short period the authorization to launch the C-130 came in. There probably was a valid reason for launching the two support aircraft within such a short time span, but security would be enhanced if the staging party that was leaving on the C-130 could be brought to the flight line in smaller groups. On a base as small as [] any time a large group of people start moving about, the place lights up like a flare. Two hours after first notification everyone was briefed and loaded. The C-124 departed at 2130Z followed by the C-130 at 2220Z.

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b. 5 Dec 59: The landing at [] was made at 0345Z and departure was made at 0435Z. This could not have been accomplished without the very efficient servicing and cooperation afforded by the []. We arrived at final destination at 0955Z. Again we were met by the local Station Commander who immediately had the hangar that had been used on previous stagings cleared for our use. 1215Z the C-130 was parked in front of the hangar and the unloading operation was started. The unloading was completed at 1245Z. Office space and sleeping space was allotted. [] was given a three hour target and route study period then put to bed. 2255Z the [] arrived in commission.

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c. 6 Dec 59: 0115Z the [] was briefed and pre-breathing was started at 0200Z. The [] was loaded aboard the [] at 0300Z to insure the 0400Z take off time. Take off was made on schedule. Throughout the entire operation at [] the local Station Commander, his officers, and men were very helpful. Anything requested was granted immediately. After receiving clearance to depart [] the return to [] was uneventful.

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B-1. DETACHMENT REPORT:

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1. Personnel: [] personnel accompanied the staging on Operation [] There were []

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[] It was intended that the doctor, [] [] would also accompany the staging. Unfortunately, it was necessary for medical reasons for [] to return to [] on 6 December and it was decided that [] would escort her, as [] presence on the operation was more important.

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2. Movement:

a. Notification of the start of the operation was received at 1930Z on Friday 4 December. At 2015Z the route was shown to the two pilots concerned and a short study of the primary targets was made. Customs was cleared at 2045Z and after loading, the C-130 took off for [] at 2220Z.

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b. Both pilots had space to sleep on the trip. The C-130 is not renowned for its passenger comfort, the temperature variations and noise being excessive. However, both pilots were well rested on the flight due to a combination of sedatives and warm sleeping bags.

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c. The C-130 landed at [] for refueling at 0345Z on 5 December. The turn around was quite rapid, occupying less than one hour.

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d. The arrival at [] was made at 1000Z and the aircraft was parked on a dispersal some distance from the main hangar area. It was decided to operate out of one of the hangars belonging to the [] and at 1215Z when the hangar was cleared the C-130 was taxied close by and all equipment was unloaded.

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3. Operations:

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a. Preflight:

(1) After unloading the two pilots (primary [] alternate []) had ample time to study the route and target maps. These maps were an innovation and proved very useful. In fact, more time was available on this mission for route study than on previous headquarters directed flights, as the route was drawn up prior to [] time.

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(2) Both pilots obtained adequate rest the night before the mission was launched. The primary pilot used sedatives, the alternate did not. The noise associated with the preflight of the [redacted] did cause breaks in the pilots sleep and it is obviously desirable to have the pilots well isolated from the maintenance area.

b. Launch: The prelaunch and launching procedures followed virtually the standard pattern. The exceptions were:

(1) An alternate pilot followed through at every stage, including prebreathing so that he could substitute at any place in the operation, if the occasion demanded. Apart from the obvious advantage to the operation, it was psychologically encouraging to the primary pilot.

(2) The pilot was loaded in the aircraft in the hangar one hour prior to takeoff and towed to the active runway for launching. Walk-around bottles were used during this period so as not to deplete the aircraft supply of oxygen. The only difficulty encountered at this stage was that this extended period without face heat produced heavy condensation on the inside of the face plate which took some time and high face heat to clear when power was finally available.

c. Mission:

(1) The flight was relatively uneventful. The aircraft and all equipment functioned perfectly with the exception of slight roll and pitch oscillations in the autopilot which could not be damped out until the latter half of the flight.

(2) The initial stage of the flight involved flight over 700 miles of undercast and the final legs home involved 1000 miles of undercast. The weather in the major target area was fortunately clear.

(3) The navigation on the first leg was virtually pure Dead Reckoning. The celestial was only of use for checking ground speeds and there were no radio aids. A forty mile track error resulted on this leg over the undercast, which was corrected 100 miles prior to point E.

(4) Although contrails on the climb ceased at 55,000 feet it was noticed as the flight progressed that the indicated outside air temperature decreased to below -41 degrees, the temperature at which trails normally appear. Finally at a point 100 miles prior to the first target a light trail with occasional larger puffs was observed behind the aircraft. At the time the flight profile was being maintained at 70,000, so a climb was started to try and clear the contrail layer.

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(5) At [] the trail persisted intermittently so flight was maintained at the higher profile until point S where the temperature started to rise and height was reduced to 70,000 feet for the remainder of the flight.

(6) Due to strong headwinds, two cutoff points were given along the route to reduce the flight plan time in the event of fuel shortage. The first cutoff point was used as the fuel was 30 gallons below the amount required at this point to complete the route.

(7) The fact that a higher and less economical profile was being flown at the time also influenced the decision.

(8) After point U undercast conditions were once again encountered which persisted back to base where a normal penetration was made.

4. General: The diversion C-130 which was airborne with ground crew aboard, to follow the [] into a diversion field if low in fuel was a sound idea. However, no provision was made on the click communication procedure if the [] was returning to []. This left the C-130 in some doubt after hearing two clicks and nothing else.

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5. Lethal Pill: The lethal pill which the pilot elected to carry on this mission proved too dangerous and fragile to carry on an aircraft without special safeguards. The device is also too large to conceal on the person, so it was not in fact carried. It is right that such a device be made available to the pilot on such a mission but it must be safer to carry and small enough to conceal. It is understood that such pills are available.

6. Recommendations:

a. Target maps be made available on all headquarters directed missions.

b. The pilot be isolated a sufficient distance from the maintenance area to ensure uninterrupted sleep before the mission.

c. The system of the alternate pilot following through at all stages be continued on such missions.

d. Face heat be available if pilot loading is made some time before power can be applied to the aircraft.

e. Up to date information on radio aids in denied territory be obtained and they be used as a navigation aid.

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f. Investigation into the phenomenon of contrails at extreme altitude be made.

g. If a diversion aircraft is used in future operations the click system be extended to cover the return of the [redacted] to its home base.

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h. More practical Lethal Pills be made available to mission pilots.

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1. Pilots' personal equipment and pre-breathing gear were transported in one specially fabricated container which was installed in fixed position on a trailer bed. This proved to be entirely satisfactory for transport purposes and also at the site. The hangar reserved for the operation at the staging site contained several office type rooms, one of which was used to set up as a pre-breathing and personal equipment area. This area was arranged to pre-breathe two pilots simultaneously.

2. Pre-breathing was commenced, as usual, at two hours prior to launch. A lawn type chaise lounge with air mattress was used for pre-breathing chair, and was found to be entirely satisfactory. Due to operational requirements it was necessary to load the pilot in the hangar at one hour prior to launch. In order to conserve the ship's oxygen supply, the pilot continued to breathe on walk-around bottles until start engine time on the runway. The Personal Equipment Technician accompanied the aircraft from hangar to runway to monitor oxygen consumption from walk-around bottle and to perform switchover to ship's oxygen system and a final personal equipment check.

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3. The personal equipment, pre-breathing, and loading phases of pilot preparation were accomplished without experiencing any difficulties.

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1. The weather station at [redacted] maintained facilities for adequate local area short range forecasting. Three hourly surface charts for [redacted] were plotted and analyzed. Highest wind and road observed were 45,000 feet, but generally overall coverage only extended to 30,000 feet.

2. The following forecast was issued to Commander, [redacted] for [redacted] Clear, 3-6 miles except temporarily 1-2 miles with smoke at dawn. Surface winds light and variable.

3. Contrails on climbout topped out at 55,000 feet but light contrails were encountered enroute at 70,000 feet. [redacted] encountered light intermittent contrails after climbing to maximum height of [redacted] feet.

4. Intelligence has estimated that 1720 nautical miles of the route and 500 nautical miles of flight lines were covered by clouds. From a weather viewpoint, on a target basis, the mission is considered to be highly successful.

5. Recommendations: Operations Order 13-59 specified that Commander, [redacted] was responsible for [redacted] terminal weather. Suggest following idea be incorporated in future operations orders: when communications schedule has been established, only weather messages containing unfavorable terminal conditions will be transmitted. During this operation it was considered that communication time should be utilized by higher priority messages.

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C. MATERIAL:

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C-1. MAINTENANCE:

1. The "GO" word was received on the staging 4 Dec at 1930Z. All personnel were briefed and the C-130 loaded and ready for take off at 2145Z. Two days previous a C-124 was loaded with the necessary fuel for the operation, and with ground handling equipment necessary to dismantle a [] if required. After arrival at the forward staging point, arrangements were completed for hangar space and the C-130 was unloaded. Sleeping bags and blankets were spread out and supper was eaten.

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2. At 1915Z the C-124 landed and the fuel was unloaded. Barrels were moved to the hangar for refueling. After preflighting the ground handling equipment we slept until 2230Z. The [] landed at 2305Z and was moved into the hangar. Preflight was completed at 0200Z. Forty five minutes before takeoff time the [] was moved to the runway and was launched at 0400Z. We then slept until 0730Z and packed up the load and put it on the C-130 except for the commo equipment. Word was received to go and commo equipment was loaded. We took off at 1630Z the 6th. Had one refueling stop and breakfast enroute.

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3. Recommendations:

a. Improvement can be made in the loading of the C-130 by using prefabricated vans such as the communications van. No deficiencies noted that did or could seriously affect the operation.

b. Recommend that checklists of all items be made and checked at regular intervals.

c. For faster loading recommend that manifests be prepared as far in advance of loading as possible.

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C-2. SPECIAL EQUIPMENT:

1. Loading:

a. Equipment on C-130:

- (1) "B" Configuration fully loaded
- (2) Power cart - loaded on trailer
- (3) Tool cart - loaded on trailer
- (4) Tent cart - loaded on trailer
- (5) Hatch dolly - loaded on trailer
- (6) Spool cradle - loaded on trailer
- (7) Tracker fully loaded - loaded on trailer
- (8) Two boxes 6000 feet material
- (9) Onan generator - loaded on trailer
- (10) Spare "B" carriage.

b. Equipment on Ferry Flight:

- (1) "B" Configuration unloaded
- (2) Tracker fully loaded

c. No problems encountered on loading operations.

2. Personnel:

a.
b.
c.

3. Pre-flight Operations:

- a. C-130 unloaded and equipment moved into hangar.
- b. Special equipment assigned room for loading purposes.

Room easily adapted to a dark room using black cloth brought for this purpose.

- c. Onan generator put into operation.
- d. Section ready for operation approximately 2 hours after loaded.
- e. Section helped with unloading of fuel on C-124.
- f. No problems encountered.

4. Operations:

a. Immediately after mission aircraft was pulled in the hangar "B" configuration was unloaded and ground checked. Configuration to be used on mission was already ground checked and on stand-by awaiting preflight check in aircraft. Tracker mounted in hatch was ground checked, clock hacked and purged. Upon receipt of [redacted] B configuration installed 2 hours before takeoff.

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b. Nitrogen bottle for purging of driftsight mounted on jeep. Problem arose on flight line, jeep was used to bring aircraft on runway so purging bottle had to be carried during movement to maintain proper purging. Cart will be taken on next staging.

c. No other problems encountered.

d. After takeoff equipment reloaded on trailer and put in readiness for loading on C-130.

5. Recommendations: Trailer to be built to house all special equipment gear. Trailer to be large enough to carry two B configurations for transport eliminating the use of dog house. Power source such as: onan and 28 volt rectifier to be built in eliminating the need for power cart. The need of this trailer is for utilizing the maximum cubage of C-130. All floor space to date has been used, but height has not been put to good advantage. The trailer should be fabricated to utilize this height for storage purposes and also as a dark room area.

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D. COMMUNICATIONS:

1. The [redacted] communications team for Operation [redacted] consisted of [redacted] radio operators and a team leader.

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2. All communications equipment required was installed in a mobile van constructed for this purpose.

3. After the support aircraft was unloaded, the communications van was moved into place at 1250Z. At 1400Z, after setting up the van, erecting antennas and cabling in the generator, attempts to establish two-way contact with [redacted] were initiated.

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4. Due to propagation difficulties two-way contact was not established until 1649Z. In the interim, [redacted] operators copied one (1) message via the [redacted] blind broadcast. This was done on the 1430 and 1445Z broadcast schedules.

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5. Once contact was established, a good communications channel was maintained until 061410Z. At that time contact was lost due to propagation conditions. The base was not heard again until 1440Z, at which time [redacted] was heard acknowledging the [redacted] closure by blind transmission. [redacted] attempted to re-establish two-way contact until 1445Z. At this latter time it was necessary to close the circuit on the instructions being transmitted in the blind by [redacted] and pack up the equipment for loading on the support aircraft.

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6. Recommendations: An improved method of setting up the expandible sides of the communications van should be devised which will facilitate the installation of the van and reduce difficulties that would be encountered should it be necessary to erect this part of the van in a strong wind.

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E. SECURITY:1. General Comments:

a. [] security personnel participated in the [] staging operation. On 4 December [] departed as courier on the C-124 carrying fuel and other equipment. This aircraft refueled at [] and proceeded from there to [] where it was to receive further instructions.

b. The main staging party, including [] and [] departed at 0020, 5 December via the C-130. The aircraft refueled at [] and immediately proceeded to the staging site. Arrival at the site was made without incident.

c. The hangar was inspected, secured and necessary arrangements were made for the arrival of the []

d. The C-124, carrying fuel, arrived the night of 5 December and was off-loaded at once. This aircraft was then immediately dispatched to [] to stand-by.

e. The [] arrived, without incident, in early morning hours of 6 December. It was refueled and preflighted at once and launched on its primary mission on the same morning.

f. Approximately six hours after the launching, the C-130 was loaded with the exception of the commo gear. Upon notification of the arrival of the [] the commo gear was loaded and the staging party departed for []. Arrival was made at [] on the morning of 7 December, after refueling at []

g. All flights were made without incident.

2. Conclusions:

a. With the exception of the aircraft support crews security was adequate in all respects. The C-130 crew in particular appeared to have been inadequately briefed by their parent division. The 322nd Air Division was in frequent contact with the C-130 and C-124 crews via unsecure communications channels. There was also communication between the 322nd and the support crews via [] which is an improper and unsecure procedure.

b. The C-124 flight order number 227 (see copy attached) listed the itinerary as far as []

c. A flight order directing the C-124 to proceed from [] and report to Commander, [] for further orders would have been more secure and desirable.

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d. In other phases of the operation the general state of security was good. All support crews were security briefed by the [redacted] Commander and Security Officer. All [redacted] personnel participating in the operation were thoroughly briefed and signed a written briefing statement. One or more security personnel accompanied each support aircraft and acted as official courier.

e. All classified equipment, documents, etc., were in the custody of the courier while enroute.

f. One or more security personnel accompanied the [redacted] while it was being launched or retrieved. While it was on the ground it was under constant observation by security personnel.

g. The exterior of the hangar was patrolled by a host national sentry and the interior was patrolled by detachment security personnel.

h. There were no personnel or security incidents.

3. Recommendations:

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a. It is recommended that support aircrew orders be cut directing them to proceed to [redacted] for further orders.

b. That the 322nd Air Division refrain from communicating with support air crews by unsecure methods.

c. That USAFE obtain diplomatic clearances and forward same by secure communications channels.

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F. MEDICAL:

1. As a first priority detail, the mission pilot and alternate were assured adequate sleeping space and equipment aboard the transport aircraft and were given a sedative immediately after takeoff. The pilots arrived at the staging site well rested and in good spirits. At the site a room with no traffic and reasonably isolated was reserved for their use. The pilots subsisted on routine crew rations, excepting the final pre-mission meal, which consisted of steak, vegetables, toast, and coffee. At twelve hours prior to launch the pilots were again sedated for a rest period. The mission pilot appeared rested, calm, and well-oriented throughout.
2. Rations for the staging party consisted of IF-7s and C-rations. These were used for in-flight subsistence as well as at the staging site. The entire water supply for internal consumption during the staging was transported with the party. The rations and water carried were adequate for the time involved and the climate encountered. Local water was used for washing only. Sleeping bags and blankets were provided for use in bivouac in the hangar.
3. No unusual illnesses resulted during or after the operation.

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